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SPITE, ALTRUISM, AND SEMANTICS: A REPLY TO WALTZ 
I basically agree with Waltz's (1981) contention that problems exist in dis-
cussions of spite and altruism which result from imprecise definitions of these 
terms. However, it is also my feeling that some of these problems are exacerbated 
by unrealistically narrow interpretations of observed phenomena. 
For example, in Waltz's precise definition of reciprocal altruism, three elements 
are assumed to be inherent: (1) one individual aids another (2) in anticipation that 
the recipient will return the favor, i.e., reciprocate; and (3) that the original actor 
benefits at some time in the future, either directly or indirectly. As Waltz points 
out, there also exists a broad definition of reciprocal altruism that comprises only 
elements 1 and 3. However, the crucial aspect of the precise definition is that 
altruistic individuals must be able to distinguish between conspecifics who will 
reciprocate and those who will not, i.e., cheaters. 
There are at least two major problems associated with this last assumption. 
First is the means by which an individual reciprocates. As Waltz points out, 
''There is no need for the actor (altruist) to be repaid directly by the recipient of its 
act, nor is it necessary for the debt to be repaid in kind." Recognition of this should 
also lead to the realization that reciprocity may be difficult to identify. Second, the 
recognition of cheaters implies that the phenomenon in question has either (1) 
been in existence long enough for selection to have acted upon it, (2) been a 
regular enough occurrence for there to have been selection against cheaters, or (3) 
been costly enough to require selection to recognize cheaters. If all of these criteria 
are not met, there may simply not be any strong selective pressure to recognize 
cheaters and if the costs to individuals of altruistic acts are minimal, a low level of 
cheating might well be tolerated in a social species (Wilson 1980, chap. 3). 
However, despite these arguments, I believe that the data described in my 
original (1980) paper meet the criteria set forth by Waltz in his precise definition of 
reciprocal altruism. There can be little doubt that a "stepmothering" female gull is 
performing an act which involves risk. She is expending considerable time and 
energy in caring for the offspring of another female, with a finite chance that she 
will not be able to mate with the father of those offspring in subsequent years. 
Either she or her new mate could die before the next breeding season (average 
annual mortality in adult gulls is about 10%-20%; Kadlec and Drury 1968; Hunt et 
al. 1980; author's unpublished observation), or the male could refuse to mate with 
her in subsequent seasons. Male western gulls have been observed to pair with a 
female for a short period, ranging from less than an hour to several weeks, and 
then either to abandon the female or drive her away (Pierotti 1981; J. C. 
Wingfield, personal communication). In any case, there is at least a 20%-30% 
chance (10% for the female and 10%-20% for her mate) that she will not be able to 
mate with the male during the next breeding season, simply because one of them 
may not survive until the next breeding season. 
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With regard to the detection of cheaters, it is clear that Waltz has not considered 
the situation carefully. The only potential cheaters are the male gulls, who could 
drive the stepmother away after using her. The male reciprocates by allowing the 
stepmother to remain on the territory, and possibly by allowing her to be his mate 
in future years. If she fails to help him raise young, he would be less likely to 
remain paired to her. It has been demonstrated in gulls that the major cause of 
separation of pairs is failure to raise offspring; whereas pairs that successfully 
raise offspring almost never separate (Coulson 1972; Pierotti 1976, 1979). The 
male is also taking a risk by allowing a strange female to remain alone on the 
territory with his eggs or chicks. The female could either ignore the eggs or chicks, 
or in an extreme case, could even kill or eat them, or drive the chicks away, since 
she has no investment in them to begin with. 
As for Waltz's contention that female cheaters would be impossible to detect, it 
is my feeling that this situation would never arise. There are only two ways that a 
female could cheat in this manner. One way would be to die, which is clearly 
nonselective. The other is to desert her mate after laying eggs and to enter the pool 
of unpaired females, a solution which leaves her no better off than the stepmother 
she is exploiting. 
The problems which I referred to earlier in this paper concerning the nature of 
reciprocity and the detection of cheaters are apparent in Waltz's discussion of my 
examples. With regard to stepmothering, there are several potential benefactees 
of the stepmother's aid. First, the deceased or departed female benefits, but she 
cannot reciprocate. Second, the mate benefits, and he may reciprocate in several 
ways, either by allowing the female to share his territory during that breeding 
season, by providing her with food and protection, or by pairing with her in 
subsequent years. Of these alternatives, only the last involves any selfishness on 
the part of the male. Finally, the chicks benefit from the care of the stepmother 
and they may reciprocate, either by providing an inexperienced female with 
experience which she could put to good use in raising her own offspring, or 
possibly by functioning as part of a family social group away from the breeding 
colony at some later date (author's unpublished observation). 
Likewise, concerning chick adoption and creching, there are at least two poten-
tial sets of benefactees from this behavior: (1) the parents whose chicks are cared 
for and (2) the chicks themselves. Most adult gulls appear to readily adopt and 
care for chicks other than their own (Holley 1981; Graves and Whiten, in press 
and references therein). Since the benefits of having chicks which are inadvertently 
lost cared for by other adults are obvious at both the individual and population 
levels (Holley 1981), the cost of the few individuals which cheated on the system 
and refused to adopt could simply be sustained at a low level. There would be 
little or no benefit, however, to those individuals which attempted to cheat by 
passing their offspring on to neighbors, since there is a very real risk that young 
chicks might be eaten once they leave the natal territory (Parsons 1971). In 
addition, parent gulls are often unable to raise even two or three offspring in any 
given year. Gulls that attempted to cheat by driving off their first brood, as 
suggested by Waltz, would be risking total loss of this brood. In addition, the 
breeding season in gulls is timed so that chicks hatch when food availability is 
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high. Therefore, to delay raising a brood for a month while incubating a second 
clutch after driving away a first brood would almost certainly reduce the fitness of 
birds that opted for this strategy. It is well known that gulls breeding later in the 
season show greatly reduced hatching and fledging success (Parsons 1975; Hunt 
and Hunt 1976; Pierotti 1979 and references therein). Similarly, cheaters at 
creches would be reducing the amount of food received by all chicks. As a result, 
they would be reducing the chances of survival of their own offspring. 
Waltz's statements concerning rates of immigration, emigration, and philopatric 
dispersal in seabird breeding colonies refer to terns (Nisbet 1978) and albatross 
(Fisher 1976). A large body of literature exists for gulls which suggests that the 
vast majority of young gulls do not return to their natal colony to breed (Olsson 
1958; Drost et al. 1961; Spaans 1971; Coulter 1975; Chabrzyk and Coulson 1977). 
This apparently occurs because young birds are often unable to establish them-
selves in crowded natal colonies such as Southeast Farallon or the part of Great 
Island where creching was observed. Under such circumstances in a long-lived 
species, site tenacity, and colony fidelity on the part of established adults may 
actually act to reduce the interrelatedness of individuals within a breeding colony. 
Thus, although it is possible that kin selection might play a factor in adoptions and 
creching, I consider it unlikely, especially given the spiteful behavior of many 
gulls directed at their neighbors. 
Waltz is certainly correct in pointing out that spiteful behavior does not gibe 
with philopatric dispersal, especially where piracy and the killing of neighboring 
chicks are concerned. It is difficult to imagine how a bird which has lost its own 
offspring can improve its fitness by killing the offspring of its relatives. 
Concerning the issue of intraspecific piracy. Waltz contends that the data do not 
distinguish between cause and effect. However, an examination of table 4 (Pierotti 
1980) will show that some pirates were capable of raising three or even four chicks 
without pirating, but switched to piracy in years when they had lost their chicks 
early in the season. In particular, male #10 (Pierotti 1980, table 4) fledged four 
chicks (2 of his own plus 2 adoptees), and had the highest feeding rate of any male 
observed during the study. In 1973, however, male #10 became a pirate after 
losing two of his three chicks shortly after hatching. In addition, since male#10 
adopted both chicks from pairs that he had robbed in 1973 as a pirate, this 
undermines Waltz's suggestion that an individual could distinguish between rela-
tives toward whom it would behave altruistically, and nonrelatives. All pirate 
males appeared to be perfectly capable of obtaining food by more conventional 
means and took no longer in foraging trips than males that obtained all their food 
by foraging at sea (Pierotti 1976, 1981). 
With regard to spite, I again have a problem with Waltz's narrow definition, in 
which he contends that a behavior must either be selfish (actor gains, recipient 
loses) or spiteful in a narrow sense (both lose), and that situations where the actor 
is not harmed, but the recipient loses do not exist. This presents at least two 
difficulties. First, it seems eminently possible that situations could arise where the 
cost to the actor is effectively cancelled by the benefit to the actor, although 
perhaps not in a precise caloric sense. Second, where both spite and altruism are 
concerned, risk is an important, but essentially unmeasurable, aspect (in precise 
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quantitative terms). If an individual performs an act that involves a high risk of 
death or serious injury and escapes unscathed, how is its investment to be 
measured? I would argue that an individual which took such a risk to harm a 
conspecific would be spiteful, even if the cost of the specific act turned out to be 
low relative to benefits, either immediate or potential. 
Waltz's narrow definition of spite is, therefore, not adequate for dealing with the 
killing of chicks. It is not necessary to demonstrate a loss of fitness to an individual 
which behaves spitefully, but even so, such risks exist. A male gull which enters 
another gull's territory risks a fight with the resident birds, which are at their most 
aggressive when defending their offspring. In addition, a fledged or nearly fledged 
gull chick can be a formidable opponent for an adult gull. Gull chicks grow to be as 
large and heavy as their parents before fledging, and will often defend the natal 
territory against intruding adults when their parents are absent (personal observa-
tion). The data of Davis and Dunn (1976) support the existence of spite. Also, 
Hand (1980) observed yellow-legged western gulls (Larus Occident alls livens) 
which had lost their eggs or chicks to attack other breeding conspecifics. 
During these attacks, while one bird engaged the resident adult in combat, others 
attacked (and often killed) the chicks of that adult. Since the risk involved to the 
spiteful birds is obvious in this instance, I feel that selfish behavior can be rejected 
as an alternative. 
To conclude, I believe that Waltz has either misread or misinterpreted my 
arguments, and that his definitions of both spite and reciprocal altruism are 
unrealistically narrow. Wilson (1980, pp. 29-45) has argued convincingly that 
"weak altruism" (altruistic acts which are not costly to the performer, but which 
definitely benefit the recipient more than the performer) may be relatively com-
mon. I would consider most of the altruistic acts which I have described as being 
examples of "weak altruism," and possibly subject only to "neutral" selection 
(Wilson 1980). 
I agree with Waltz that ethologists should fully consider alternative inter-
pretations of behavior. However, Waltz fails to appreciate that I was attempting to 
operate within the context of inclusive fitness, and that in general, most of my 
explanations deal with the possible selective value of apparent nonselective be-
havior. It is also well for us to realize that there are pitfalls involved in optimiza-
tion arguments (Lewontin 1978; Maynard Smith 1978). Therefore, rather than 
invoking kin selection or selfish individual behavior as Waltz appears to, it might 
be worthwhile to consider that animals may behave in a fashion which may have 
either no effect or a negative effect on their individual fitnesses. As Wilson (1980, 
p. 43) has pointed out, "There is already a trend toward renaming all forms of 
altruism that can evolve as 'genetic selfishness,' which presumably reserves the 
term 'altruism' for anything that can't evolve." 
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